



Privatization Contracts with the German
Treuhandanstalt: An Insiders' Guidet
The German "Treuhandanstalt" (literally translated, "Trustee Agency" and
hereafter referred to as Treuhandanstalt, Treuhand, or THA) was established to
perform a massive, historical, and unexpected task. It is the independent agency
of the German Government entrusted with the job of helping convert the command
economy of former East Germany into a modern, social market economy.
In order to understand the Treuhand, a brief history is necessary. The Treu-
hand's precursor was established in March 1990 under the last Communist regime
in East Germany. The Treuhand as we now know it was first empowered in July
1990 under the terms of the Treuhandgesetz.' On its creation, the Treuhand
overnight became the largest holding-type company in the world. It immediately
took legal title to all the companies that previously had belonged to the state of
East Germany and assumed the responsibility for their interim administration and
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rapid privatization. The Treuhand began its task on July 1, 1990, with a staff of
about 200 mostly East German employees and a portfolio containing over 12,500
companies (after spin-offs), plus over 20,000 restaurants and retail stores. Many
of the 12,500 original Treuhand companies included diverse and unrelated activi-
ties under one corporate umbrella; they are estimated to have comprised some-
thing like 35,000 individual economic entities. When the Treuhand was first called
into being, its portfolio companies employed over four million employees. History
had not given anyone much time to ready East Germany for market.
Since July 1990 the Treuhand has made impressive progress. All 20,000 restau-
rants and retail stores are now in private hands. As of September 1992, about
8,500 companies or parts of companies have been privatized and are now being
managed by the entrepreneurial owners who took them over. From January
through September 1992, companies were being sold at the rate of approximately
twenty per day. Close to 500 companies, with approximately 9 percent of total
employee count, have been sold to foreign investors, who, from the beginning,
have been eligible to purchase 100 percent of a company and are eligible for all
the incentives offered to West German firms.
The Treuhand itselfbuiltup rapidly from ahandful of people with bad phone connec-
tions to a functioning institution of around 4,000 employees plus 800 full-time consul-
tants. These people are divided approximately equally between the central office in
Berlin and the fifteen branch offices distributed among the major cities of the new
federal states. The Treuhand has become a large organization, but, it is hoped, not for
long. Its explicit goal is to sell its portfolio and put itself out of business as quickly and
responsibly as possible, a job it is completing with remarkable speed.
Given the uniqueness of the historical circumstances that brought the Treuhand
into being, the Treuhand itself has developed into a unique institution with a set
of goals, procedures, problems, and opportunities peculiarly its own. This article
discusses how the uniqueness of the Treuhand and the current circumstances in
the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) affect the process of purchasing
a Treuhand company. Part I provides an overview of the Treuhand's functions
and considers some peculiarities regarding the negotiation of acquisition contracts
with the Treuhandanstalt. This part of the discussion is business-oriented, geared
to the concerns of investors first approaching the organization. Part II then details
particularly important, recurring possibilities of arrangements and clauses in
contracts that may grow from the peculiarities outlined in part I. Here the discus-
sion is of possible contract terms and is legally oriented. Part III concludes that
the Treuhandanstalt's experiences can provide valuable lessons to other former
Communist countries in their efforts to privatize their economies.
The article was written with several main objectives in mind. First, the authors
(one a former and one a current Treuhandanstalt employee) find their personal
experiences in this unusual time and place fascinating, and hope that others might
share their interest. Second, the article is intended to help those who want to
approach the Treuhandanstalt to understand the institution better, thereby helping
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professionals to learn more about how to take advantage of the historically unique
chances the Treuhand offers. The Treuhand is actively trying to encourage greater
involvement by non-German investors, and this article is intended to increase the
transparency of the process by sharing some "insiders' "reflections on it. Third,
during its brief existence, the Treuhand has been the object of great criticism,
some of it well founded, some of it reflecting a lack of understanding of the
organization and how it must work. The organization is a large, complex, and
improvised attempt to solve a massive and convoluted set of problems. It is an
adolescent bureaucracy, born of chaos and destined to be phased out without ever
functioning normally. It is a human creation, whipped together quickly and then
put under extreme pressure without time to prepare. Business as usual cannot be
expected. Though the Treuhand is far from perfect, in historical retrospect it and
its accomplishments may well be judged more kindly than is now the case.
Last but not least, although the THA itself is unique, the problems that it has had
to address have analogues in every former command economy. Given its special
conditions, Germany was forced and able to proceed faster and further with its
privatization program than any other country. Through the establishment of groups
such as the Treuhand Ost Beratung GmbH (Treuhand East Consulting Company)
and the Treuhand Alumni Club, an effort is being made to ensure that the Treu-
hand's collective experience of the past two years can, in some small measure, be
passed on further. It is hoped that this article, written in the world's most widely
understood language, will support the Treuhand's efforts in this direction. Long
after the bulk of the German privatization campaign is over, other countries will be
struggling with theirs. This guide to the inner workings of a successful pioneer may
aid and encourage them in their task. They are not the first, and they are not alone.
I. Treuhandanstalt Peculiarities
The process of buying corporations in the former GDR differs greatly from that
of buying an established company in the old West German federal states or in other
capitalist economies. The Treuhand's companies were not built like capitalist com-
panies and the Treuhand is not at all like a normal, profit-motivated seller.
Under East German communism, the business class was effectively banned and
decision-making was heavily centralized. At the individual level, GDR companies
were thus largely production facilities operating according to a central plan. They
had little need to develop in-house capabilities in marketing, finance, financial
controlling, strategic planning, or law, and they are now suffering accordingly.
GDR companies were formed to suit one system. Then, virtually overnight, the
system vanished, leaving them to cope with the sudden shock of the introduction
of the market economy. With legal and economic unification, local East German
markets were immediately opened to fierce competition, both from West German
and from other international suppliers. Most of the costs and the rules of doing
business changed drastically. East German consumers for the first time had hard,
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convertible currency with which to buy long-coveted western goods, and the
hard-pressed trading partners of East German companies had to pay for products
in scarce deutsche marks (DM). The combination of shocks would have tried even
the most competent western managers, let alone managers trained only in a
predictable, if scarcity-plagued, world of overwhelming state control.
A. SOCIAL CRITERIA IN TREUHANDANSTALT SALES
When making a decision between competing bidders for a company, THA takes
into account not only the typical sales criteria (maximum profit yield at a minimum
of contractual risk) but also a range of "soft" concerns reflecting the social,
employment, business structure, and industrial policies of the German Govern-
ment. The Treuhand has no desire to "take the money and run." Instead it looks
to the mid- to long-term commitment and credibility of each potential purchaser
to ensure that THA institutional goals are reached. These concerns are basically
foreign to any private seller. The range of issues that the Treuhand insists on
keeping on the table may often confuse or frustrate negotiating partners who do
not understand or agree with the Treuhand or its motivations.
Even if one potential investor offers a higher purchase price for a company, the prize
may go to a bidder offering less money but more guaranteed jobs, or to a smaller bidder
offering less money, but fewer oligopolistic ties. Bidders incessantly appeal to this
"social conscience" in order to justify demands for a reduction in purchase price.
Though the impact of such nonprice factors on THA decision-making is substantial,
the exact weight to be given to the various factors cannot be precisely foreseen. THA
has no set formula for valuing companies or competing bids. Each case is decided
on its own merits. In its first two years, the Treuhand recorded sales proceeds for its
companies of 35.2 billion DM and total investment guarantees of 125.3 billion DM
plus 30 billion for modernization of company-owned heating and power plants, a 5:1
ratio that indicates how seriously the Treuhand values investment guarantees, and how
much in sales proceeds it will sacrifice to get them.
Because of the long-term and broad-ranging perspective of the Treuhand, bid-
ders are almost invariably requested to submit a business plan that describes
their intentions for the company. This plan generally should include not just the
purchase price, but a thorough discussion of how the bidder intends to address
the Treuhand's social concerns. The plan should thus consider the expected level
of investment, both in fixed assets and in human capital, the projected employment
over the next several years, and a description of how the bidder plans otherwise
to develop the company, its production, and its markets.
B. TREUHANDANSTALT'S NEGOTIATING "PERSONALITY"
1. Seller's Motivation
The combination of systemic shocks described above virtually ensured that
Treuhand companies would lose more money and need more help than anyone
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could have imagined in the first euphoria after the fall of the Wall. Once commu-
nism's hermetic seal was broken, it became clear that many East German compa-
nies were quickly wasting assets. Some companies, especially in growth indus-
tries, have been able to make an effective switch into the market economy while
still owned by the Treuhand. All are trying. The Treuhand has spent billions to
bring its companies into a standardized legal and accounting format, to help
managers develop business plans, and to restructure companies to respond to
market conditions.
At the same time, not all firms can adjust effectively to current conditions, even
with the help of armies of consultants and newly hired managers. Company
managements, all too often, though understandably, respond with paralysis-
looking to the Treuhand to provide them with the next five-year plan, or better
yet, with a new owner. The paralysis is often compounded because the Treuhand,
itself a stop-gap solution, is not normally able to make substantial new investments
in plant, preferring instead to leave that to the new owners. Without new owners
with the incentive and ability to provide the missing ingredients that neither the
Treuhand, nor its consultants, nor its portfolio companies can provide, the situa-
tion for many individual companies tends only to worsen over time. Treuhand
negotiation teams are acutely aware of the time pressure under which they must
close sales.
The THA has "deep pockets" and does not need sales revenues to continue
its operations. While private sellers normally need sales proceeds to attain a
particular goal-to repay stockholders, satisfy debts, invest elsewhere-this is not
the case for the Treuhand. Sales proceeds are returned to a central account and
disappear from the view or control of those responsible for the sale.
In the usual context, the seller's emotional connections often play a central, if
hidden, role in negotiations. The THA negotiation teams will normally have little
emotional connection to the companies that they are selling. Those people who
do care, the senior managers who have invested decades in a firm, are relegated
to a fairly minor role in the sales process and their feelings are regarded as
peripheral. Though harsh, the reality is that they are used for information and,
if willing, to further the sale, but they do not control negotiations or make the
final decision. That rests with the often young Treuhand negotiator on whose desk
the file just landed.
The result is that THA negotiators tend not to adopt overly aggressive purchase
price demands and negotiating strategies. They also are often prepared to grant
more favorable terms if prospective purchasers can factually substantiate claimed
shortcomings of the enterprise. This attitude is not surprising given that the THA's
ultimate goal is to create the groundwork for a healthy economy in the former
GDR. Leaving investors some margin to build a solid business is seen to be in
the general societal interest. Nevertheless, though they may lack a seller's normal
human greed, THA negotiators-whether out of personal, professional, and moral
standards, or out of need to satisfy the ever-increasing demands of internal contract
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review staff-will try to avoid "underselling" a company. All proposed sales for
less than net book value must be internally justified in writing.
2. Staffing Stress Points to Remember
When the Treuhand began its moral equivalent of war, virtually no steps had
been taken to ready it for battle. Though it may look deceptively permanent,
the Treuhand has very little in common with an ordinary government ministry
established to handle the day-to-day business of a more or less orderly world. It
is a large "hit squad," called together quickly to respond to a crisis hard to
comprehend in its scope and depth.
The urgent need to establish a Treuhand created many unexpected and some
unique staffing problems. The Treuhand had to staff up quickly at a time when
the job market for professionals with the experience and ability required
to sell Treuhand-owned companies was extremely tight. It offered midterm
assignments, brutally long working hours, and an unformed structure in a
country where long-term security, leisure time, and order are highly cherished.
Insofar as the qualified workers were largely from former West Germany, the
Treuhand also had to entice managers to move, and often to live for months
in hotels. Given both the German housing shortage and a cultural propensity
to stay put, this was a much harder proposition in Germany than it would be
in the United States.
Initially, salaries and benefits for midlevel managers substantially exceeded
West German norms, a necessary inducement to attract competent staff. While
the money was important, what the Treuhand could also offer was a never-to-be
repeated challenge, where one could quickly assume responsibility, gather experi-
ence, and make contacts impossible in the normal, hierarchical world of German
business. Many responded to the call and the Treuhand has become an "in" place
to work for ambitious young professionals.
Persuading more seasoned managers to leave their existing positions and work
at the Treuhand has proven more difficult than getting younger staff members.
During the first year or so of its existence, many senior managers were seconded
from large corporations. They agreed to lend staff to the Treuhand for a limited
period, out of motivations that normally included an uncertain mix of patriotism
and self-interest. The vast bulk of these seconded managers successfully avoided
conflicts of interest, and many of the Treuhand's positive achievements, especially
during its first eighteen months, would have been impossible without them. These
seconded managers are generally and gradually being replaced by full-time staff
members. A number of other Treuhand senior managers are life-tenured West
German bureaucrats on loan from their respective ministries. A third group of
senior managers, including some of the very best professionals at the THA,
comprises people near the end of their careers or coaxed out of retirement to help
turn the unification of Germany into a reality.
Staff changes are frequent as seconded managers return to their permanent jobs
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and ongoing internal reshuffling leads to reallocation of work. The organization
is gradually settling into a routine, but it will never be as stable as normal minis-
tries. If negotiations are protracted, staff changes can and often do lead to delays
and difficulties.
Negotiators are well advised to keep in mind the stresses under which their
THA counterparts must work. Though the organization is large, in many areas
it has been seriously understaffed. In a common scenario in the central offices,
one might find a junior manager in his or her midthirties with several years' work
experience in a major bank, consulting firm, or law firm who is responsible for
selling ten to twenty companies that may have had an aggregate of well over 5,000
employees. In the various Treuhand branch offices the junior manager will be
responsible for more firms, but a lower employee count. The junior manager
(who may not even appear on the organizational chart) could report to a senior
manager in his or her late thirties or early forties, who is supervising six or eight
junior managers, all with comparable work loads. The entire section might share
one, or if it is lucky, two secretaries. Each section reports to a director, who is
responsible for a number of such sections. Prime negotiating partners are thus
often less experienced and less closely supervised than one might hope. The
system is working, but never quite as well as anyone would like. For would-be
purchasers, patience, persistence, politeness, and a good sense of when-and
when not to-try to have supervisors drawn into the process, are often crucial
keys to successful negotiation.
As the Treuhand sells an ever-larger portion of its portfolio, however, the
work load for individual managers and sections is correspondingly decreasing.
The processes for selling companies are becoming routinized and subject to
tighter internal review. Though pressure to sell companies remains intense,
there is more time to spend on each sale. The pioneer days are over. The
better-trained Treuhand teams are now more likely to be capable of managing
a consistent and adequate quality sales process than was previously the case.
In addition, the Treuhand has developed a large internal controlling staff that
plays an increasingly active role in negotiations. Approval of controlling staff
has become a prerequisite for most sales. To get that approval, the salespeople
must convince the controlling staff that the deal makes sense and was reached
by following the rules.
As the Treuhand proceeds with its work, staff members are increasingly threat-
ened with selling themselves out of their jobs. The Treuhand has announced initial
staffing cuts in 1993, with deeper cuts in succeeding years. The smaller branch
offices are beginning to close, as are some of the smaller industry branches. To
avoid surprises, prospective investors should ask about the life expectancy of the
particular section responsible for the company they want, as well as about the
future plans of their main negotiating partners. Surprisingly, though, the pace of
privatization does not seem to have slowed as the number of companies to sell
has shrunk. As a deadline nears for closing a particular area, the sales pace may
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actually increase as section leaders and directors push to get their promised success
bonuses.
3. Due Diligence and Superior Knowledge of the Purchaser
In normal acquisition contracts, sellers know what they are selling far better
than buyers know what they are buying. A seller's superior knowledge usually
results from long years of management experience, sometimes dating back to the
foundation of the enterprise. As a rule, a purchaser has only a limited opportunity
to become familiar with the target by means of inspections, presentation of certain
documents, tests, or consultations with the management. Not infrequently, a seller
will deliberately restrict a potential purchaser's access to information.
The THA operates in a different world. In the initial days of the Treuhand's
existence, negotiation teams often had little or no information about the companies
they were selling before they entered negotiations. The information flow to negoti-
ation teams has improved drastically over the past two years as consultants have
produced reams of reports and Treuhand staff members have had a chance to
get a sense of the companies within their areas of responsibility. Despite these
improvements, prospective purchasers often understand the companies far better
than the THA sellers. Potential buyers who are new to the THA context are
incredulous when they relay company information previously unknown to the
THA sales teams. Nevertheless, such a situation frequently occurs, and the infor-
mation is usually appreciated.
Though many THA negotiators, particularly in the industry-organized THA
central offices, have solid industry knowledge, not all do. Even those who do may
not fully understand the niches in which a particular firm operates. Prospective
purchasers who share some of their branch-specific knowledge with THA negotia-
tors not only quickly learn what their partners know, they also help develop the
Treuhand negotiators' confidence that they are the sort of serious investors the
THA wants.
The uneven distribution of knowledge about the target typically forces the
Treuhand to place unusual importance on a variety of expert opinion that it
commissions to help its decision-making. Given the lack of other reliable informa-
tion about individual companies, the Treuhand often finds it difficult to justify
deviating from the findings of its appointed experts.
The Treuhand's most obvious source of data about individual companies is firm
management. Though this source is critical, it is for several reasons not always
as reliable or forthcoming as the THA would like. The Treuhand has had the
unenviable job of having to dismiss over 1.5 million employees from its portfolio
companies in order to trim work forces down to a point where firms might interest
potential buyers. Companies frequently have the impression that the Treuhand,
as the super-owner, is the source of all their problems-rather than the inheritor
of them. Since companies have been under Treuhand management, THA staff
members have normally not had the time, continuity, or context to develop trusting
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relationships with the managers of the companies in their charge. This then leads
to miscommunication on essential points and blocking of information flow to the
THA.
Potential purchasers have a much simpler relationship to company manage-
ment. While the Treuhand plays the role of the short-term "heavy," potential
purchasers can present themselves as long-term saviors. They would often have
had past competition or delivery relations with target firms, which would have
provided them with accurate and detailed insights into the company before they
approached the THA as potential purchasers. Company managers often inwardly
go over to the side of the purchaser, whom they expect to continue the business
successfully and keep them employed. Though the managers of Treuhand compa-
nies are liable to honor their fiduciary duties to the THA, concepts about avoidance
of conflicts have not had long to take root in the minds of many former East
German managers. The process continues of clarifying, tightening, and enforcing
the ground rules governing how THA company managers need to deal with
prospective purchasers. Much progress has been made, but the fundamental ten-
sions between THA and management remain, which are sometimes used, legally
or not, to a purchaser's benefit.
During the early stages of the Treuhand's history, not infrequently the prospec-
tive purchaser had (usually unbeknownst to the THA) already taken over the
management in an informal way. East German managers would welcome West
German "big brother" companies, permitting them to remove employees, rebuild
production facilities, and in some cases make considerable investments (often
without legal basis-the naievetd was not purely limited to the East Germans),
even before the start of any negotiations. Likewise, often without asking for
THA's approval, panicked firm managers would give complete access to the
company and all available information on it to anyone who appeared to be a
prospective investor. Information thus released has been misused more than once.
Prospective purchasers have been known to go so far as to exert influence on the
selection of the auditor and on other experts and the preparation of the DM opening
balance sheet.
Treuhand company managers are now under strict instructions to get THA
approval before permitting potential purchasers access to the company and its
documents. The THA frequently conditions its approval on the signing of confi-
dentiality agreements. Once this approval is given, prospective purchasers gener-
ally have free access to all the firm's data. Normally, they can afford to spend
far more time reviewing it than can their THA counterparts.
An individual THA company manager may have personal reasons for blocking
access to data, such as having proposed his own management buy-out scheme and
not wanting to have his scheme supplanted by the prospective purchaser, or having
a strong preference-for whatever reason-for one candidate. If a prospective
purchaser suspects that data are not forthcoming because of such a possible
conflict, the prospective purchaser should request that the responsible THA seller
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try to resolve the access problem. Potential purchasers suffering from due dili-
gence logjams should not assume that either the THA seller or the entire company
management team shares the self-interest of the blocking company manager.
The quality of the data uncovered in due diligence is, of course, widely variable.
Though some companies may be able to present potential purchasers with records
quite comparable to what one would find in well-managed western companies,
that is not always the case. Again, with persistence and the normally forthcoming
cooperation of management, most purchasers are able to build a reasonably com-
plete picture of the company.
D. FACTORS SIMPLIFYING ACQUISITION CONTRACTS
Several different forces are at play that result in THA acquisition contracts
being much shorter and simpler than "normal" acquisition contracts.
1. Relative Irrelevance of Company History
Privatization almost always involves a far-reaching new beginning for former
state enterprises. Treuhand-owned companies are often viewed by purchasers as
a kernel, from which future product development and market entry will grow.
Treuhand companies can offer potential purchasers four main advantages: a stable
supply of highly trained workers who will work, at least for now, at a discount
from West German wages; additional (if imperfect) production capacity at a
reasonable price; European Community-based real property in which to operate;
and the remnants of an old distribution system and beginnings of a new one.
Frequently, new owners will use the company purchased as a vehicle to produce
new products with new technologies, to be sold through newly created distribution
systems in new markets. Given that the future will inevitably look very different
from the past, the history of individual companies is often of limited interest to
purchasers-other than as a possible link to opening eastern markets. Many of the
normal mergers and acquisitions representations and warranties regarding the
history of the company and performance data of the past thus become superfluous.
Without risk to the purchaser, much of the usual "laundry list" can be reduced
dramatically.
2. Simplicity of Communist Companies
Due to the centrally planned economy, GDR state-owned firms had compara-
tively simple outside relationships. They were pure production and distribution
facilities, with little or no responsibility for marketing or finance. The complex
contracts found in capitalist countries were unknown in Communist GDR. Insofar
as a company has mortgages and other encumbrances against land, factoring
agreements, complex stock ownership and option structures, and the like, they
are probably of recent origin. Patents and trademarks play a part in only limited
cases. The relative simplicity of this system of contracts and legal rights often
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saves the purchaser much worry. Recent contracts need to be checked carefully,
as do old contracts with foreign trade companies, but the checklist is likely to be
short. Legally, most THA companies, even the large ones, are very basic entities.
Precurrency-reform loans, for example, typically were debt either to the state
bank or to a state-owned foreign trading company. In either case, this debt would
have been refinanced by the responsible successor agency as part of a package
in which billions of marks of such debt was refinanced. The terms of the refinanc-
ing at the individual company level would be standard and simple. In the former
GDR, huge amounts of debt were loaded onto the balance sheets of individual
firms so that the state could claim that it ran no deficit. Predictably, the debt
numbers bore little relation to any money ever seen by the company managers.
Potential purchasers occasionally misinterpret the bloated debt figures as a sign
of something foul at the individual company level. In fact, the incompetence and
corruption took place far higher in the system, to the outrage of individual firm
managers, who then had to carry the burden.
3. "As Is, Where Is" Sales
Given its limited knowledge, the Treuhand is normally reluctant to give any
but the most basic representations and warranties about its companies. For non-
German purchasers, especially for potential purchasers coming from the United
States, the Treuhand's unwillingness to give the customary representations and
warranties poses a substantial stumbling block in negotiations. Though western
German contracts have been gradually bloating as American-style clauses are
imported, German mergers and acquisitions contracts are lean by U.S. standards.
Treuhand contracts are leaner still. To those used to allocating transactional risk
precisely by lengthy and hotly negotiated catalogues, the Treuhand's typically
meager offerings may seem to offer an impossibly low degree of comfort.
The problem can become especially acute when the German subsidiaries of non-
German companies try to convince management at the head office that a transaction
is sound and fair. To overlawyered American eyes, the THA contract looks too
short to be prudent. The head office representatives who appear briefly in Germany
for a day or two of negotiations often cannot satisfy themselves that their German
representatives have done enough due diligence to justify the exceptional step of
waiving the normal protections. The Treuhand representatives cannot give addi-
tional comfort, especially if the potential purchaser knows far better than they the
actual risks involved. The result can be a deadlock that benefits no one.
Rather than insisting on the usual protections-thereby not only straining rela-
tions, but also risking losing what could be a good deal-potential purchasers of
Treuhand companies are well advised to drop their usual preconceptions and adopt
their negotiating strategy to the exceptional reality. The Treuhand is much more
like the harried clerk in the closing sale of a second-hand shop, than the genteel
owner of a fancy boutique. Shrewd buyers should behave accordingly: check the
merchandise thoroughly, push hard on the few points that matter, and aim for the
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quickest closing possible, before getting leapfrogged by someone who knows the
ropes and accepts the process for what it is.
The Treuhand is selling some remarkable bargains, but they do not come with
ribbons and bows. Potential buyers should take the time in the company itself to
do the basic research they need to feel comfortable in selling the deal effectively
to the board back home. If their study does not bring comfort, they should not
agonize. They should make an offer that reflects the degree of comfort as of the
deadline. If that fails, they should move quickly onto the next deal, using what
they learned in the last one. The sale is going fast, and waiting is rarely a good
strategy. If the potential buyer eventually decides to wait to buy a firm from a
private seller in the secondary market, after a turnaround has begun, the price
will probably be much higher than the Treuhand offer.
II. Particular Clauses in Contracts
A. EMPLOYMENT CLAUSES
Given the ongoing structural crisis in the former GDR and the scale of the effort
needed even to begin to bring it under control, the urgency of the Treuhand's
need to maintain and create jobs cannot be overestimated. The Treuhand does not
just pay lip service to the goal of employment, it forgoes substantial potential gain
in the sale of its enterprises to ensure future jobs. Given this institutional emphasis,
it is not surprising that contracts normally include an agreed number of full-time
equivalent jobs that will be maintained for an agreed period of time. If this target
number is not reached, the purchase price will be increased subsequently, or the
purchaser will have to pay a penalty. Employment clauses are frequent. Though
legally simple, they are of great importance to both sides.
The Treuhand negotiates to have penalties set at a level that ensures that the
agreed employment levels are maintained. Frequently, the penalty approaches the
cost of keeping an employee on staff.
Investors normally make little progress when they try to build loopholes into
employment clauses by inserting broad "conditions beyond the purchaser's con-
trol" language. The Treuhand generally expects that the penalties for failure to
maintain agreed employment levels will be paid regardless of the grounds for the
failure. Especially unwelcome is buyer-proposed language that attempts to make
unexpected market conditions a trigger to escape the penalty. The world of market
risks is, after all, the jungle in which entrepreneurs make their gains. To a greater
or lesser extent (with pure real estate transactions being a notable exception), the
THA has granted price concessions in exchange for employment promises. The
Treuhand trades so much against the quality of the investor and its belief in the
investor's business plan that it regards it as only just to ask for those concessions
back in the form of a penalty, if the promises that prompted the concessions are
not kept. Long after the privatization of the Treuhand's companies is complete,
a THA staff will remain to supervise all forward-looking contract clauses.
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B. INVESTMENT CLAUSES
Because the Treuhand must play a catalytic role in the rebuilding of East
Germany, it pays close attention to the amount and kind of investment to which
a particular purchaser commits to itself. Binding investment promises from solid
purchasers are an anchor for the future. They offer hope of survival to business
enterprises and help arrest the trend to deindustrialization of the former GDR.
Investment clauses use the same technique as employment clauses to ensure
that the purchaser makes certain investments in the target company. Agreements
commonly specify both the amount to be invested in the target and the time
period during which the investment must remain invested. Though employment
obligations may be fairly easily defined, defining "investment" can pose prob-
lems. Depending on the objective, such clauses can range from broad definitions
of total investment goals before a certain deadline, thus leaving an investor wide
discretion over the specific types of investment and their financing, to precise
specifications of actual investment measures to be undertaken, their financing,
and their timing. If the agreed investment is not made, contractual penalties must
be paid, often equal to 50 percent or more of the investment not made.
Many purchasers of THA companies are able to put together financing packages
that enable them to make the required investments with a substantially smaller
outlay of their own capital than would be necessary under more normal circum-
stances. The numerous government incentive programs, if used fully, can repay
up to 50 percent of the costs of new investment and help finance the remainder
at favorable terms. Also, because the Treuhand is willing to trade purchase price
against other guarantees, it frequently happens that a company, as a going concern,
will be sold for less than the value of its parts. This often substantial unencumbered
asset value can be used to secure debt to make the required investments. Given
that many investors in these conditions put little down to get more than they paid
for, investment clauses can restrict creative leveraging and require investors to
put their own risk capital into the company purchased. For the Treuhand, this
extra link tying the investor to the object can be especially important where the
actual purchase price is small.
An indication of the weight the Treuhand gives such clauses is that as of
the end of July 1992 Treuhand sales contracts contained investment guarantees
totalling 120 billion DM while the Treuhand realized only 21 billion DM in sales
proceeds. It is hoped that this investment will encourage more new investment,
thus having a multiplier effect throughout the economy.
C. SPECULATION AND ASSET-STRIPPING CLAUSES
Speculation clauses enable the Treuhand to enforce a bidder's original state-
ments of intent about the company purchased. Their goal is to stop the destruction
of a company by a purchaser who wants to tear out the surplus value lying within,
when the company was sold on the understanding that the purchaser was to
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continue it. If the purchaser resells a company at a gain to a second buyer, the
THA should normally have no reason to recoup that gain as long as the second
buyer continues to run the company in accordance with the social criteria argued
for by the original purchaser and the THA. Speculation clauses provide for a
revaluation in case of any resale, lease, or use of real estate deviating from the
agreed purpose. Their time frame of five to fifteen years is longer than that of
a typical revaluation clause. Speculation clauses are not intended to return windfall
real estate gains, but to increase the purchase price subsequently only if the
social target aimed at by THA has not been realized. In their preventive effect,
speculation clauses are the functional equivalents of business continuation, em-
ployment, and investment clauses explained below.
Speculation clauses are drafted similarly to the revaluation clauses described
above, but with a different thrust. Defining and agreeing on the event of specula-
tion or asset-stripping is frequently complex. Purchasers seek to have "specula-
tion" defined narrowly so that the revaluation right of the THA only arises for
a clear failure to fulfill the contractual purpose. The Treuhand seeks to define
"speculation" broadly to provide it (and more importantly, the workers and
towns that the THA is trying to protect) with real protection against clever evasion.
To satisfy purchasers' legitimate interests, it may be necessary to exempt
financing-driven "sale and lease back" procedures or corporate reorganizations
or sales that do not undermine the THA's contractual goals.
In lieu of a revaluation right, the THA may sometimes agree to retain a right
to the return of the property in the event of speculation, if necessary secured by
registration of a transfer deed. As a third alternative, a "surplus levy" may be
imposed based on the actual resale price. This third option may spare the purchaser
the risk of having to pay on the basis of a revaluation by neutral experts, which
value may exceed the realized resale price. In order to prevent an intermediate
sale at a manipulated low price, the THA then reserves either a right of first
refusal or to impute a fair market resale price. If a dispute arises, this market price
may, after all, have to be determined by an expert.
D. BUSINESS CONTINUATION CLAUSES
Business continuation clauses largely overlap with speculation clauses and
occasionally fuse completely. Technically, however, they are drafted slightly
differently because their triggering event is the shutdown or modification of the
existing plant, regardless of any speculative sale of real estate. In general, business
continuation clauses are not used as often as speculation clauses. The Treuhand's
motivation for requiring business continuation clauses is comparable to its reasons
for requiring speculation clauses and the other terms it negotiates to realize its
social goals.
In a number of instances the Treuhand has insisted on such a clause when the
company was clearly worth more "dead than alive," but the Treuhand wanted
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to continue it for its own broader reasons. In one extreme case involving a purchase
by an American multinational company, the Treuhand was selling a completely
new industrial facility that had been commissioned in the final days of the GDR.
The multimillion dollar bill came due after currency reform and after the company
responsible for its payment had become a Treuhand-owned GmbH. The facility,
a grandiose showpiece of GDR autarchy, was overbuilt and overscaled for market
needs. Its massive halls appeared designed to withstand military attack. The
Treuhand faced the choice of permitting the company to go bankrupt and then
selling its parts, or trying to find a buyer for the entire business, "gold doorknobs"
and all. If the company had gone bankrupt, the Treuhand would have further
weakened an already economically weak area. Since many of the creditors of the
company were themselves Treuhand-owned firms, permitting bankruptcy and
repudiation of the company's debts would have caused a ripple effect of payment
problems in a substantial number of THA companies. The simplest and ultimately
cheapest solution for the THA was thus deemed to be to pay the bill for "gold
doorknobs," then sell the company for a price reflecting the actual market worth
of the facility and to require the buyer to continue the business in operation. If
the buyer fails to continue the business, it will have to pay a penalty initially
substantial and decreasing in stages over the first six years after the purchase.
E. REVALUATION CLAUSES FOR REAL ESTATE
The THA and the purchaser often agree to have expert appraisers revalue real
estate for a second time after a period of two, three, or five years. If the real estate's
value has increased since the sale, the purchase price is adjusted subsequently.
Revaluation clauses take effect regardless of the purchaser's use of the real estate.
They are not sanctions for failure to meet obligations, which are discussed later
in this article.
Though this kind of provision sounds potentially unfair, it is necessitated by
the odd market conditions in the former GDR. Because of the absence of an
established real estate market, the parties often cannot know what a piece of real
estate is really worth. This lack of knowledge frequently yields a hidden windfall
gain for purchasers, even as of the closing of a contract. Thus, for a limited period
of time, increases in value due to developments of the real estate market after
contract conclusion are to be returned to the THA.
Revaluation clauses raise numerous technical problems that can be resolved by
a range of alternatives. A threshold question is whether a clause should apply only
to land or also to buildings. To decide, the THA assesses the quality of the building
substance, the relative values of the buildings and the land, and the location and
size of the real estate. The criteria used to revalue property have to be identical
to those used to determine its initial worth. Value increases due to investments
made by the purchaser are measured and netted out.
Potential purchasers sometimes fear such clauses as imposing unknown and
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uncontrollable future risks. A number of solutions help reduce the purchaser's
risk, while assuring the THA its fair share of the newly established market value.
"Lids" can be agreed as maximum permissible increases either in percent or in
absolute square meter prices. A minimum can be set, so that only increases of
more than an agreed percentage or set value will be returned to the THA. The
THA may in some cases agree to share the windfall gain with the purchaser
according to a preset formula. Liquidity problems can be allayed, if need be, by
THA grants of reasonable respites for payment on reevaluation, or by other
comparable arrangements.
Since revaluation clause claims will only be made if a higher property value
is subsequently established, such clauses will, in the final analysis, be neutral in
balance sheet effect. As the real estate markets in the former GDR have become
more established and market values more certain, the need for revaluation clauses
has decreased. They are thus increasingly less likely to be required in THA
contracts.
F. PURCHASE PRICE, RESPITE FOR PAYMENT, AND GUARANTEES
THA privatization contracts resemble normal acquisition contracts in the
payment obligations of the purchaser. As a rule, THA only transfers title in
exchange for payment of the purchase price. If it grants a respite for payment,
it requires guarantees. Any attempts by a purchaser to make the THA put part
of the payment at risk (for instance, by having the payor be a newly founded
shell company) are usually not successful. Delaying payment does not normally
reduce the effective purchase price since market interest rates have to be paid
for outstanding balances. In order to simplify matters, many purchasers pay
in advance of formal transfer of ownership. In real estate sales, for example,
the purchase price often is to be paid at notarization and not when the transfer
is registered in the land records. The buyer risks little in trusting the Treuhand
to carry through with the deal.
G. UNKNOWN RISKS AND RESERVES FOR POTENTIAL LIABILITIES
When former state-owned enterprises first were brought under the THA's
jurisdiction, each company was established in a corporate form recognized under
German law (GmbH or AG). Each had to file an "Initial DM Balance Sheet,"
giving a first snapshot of the status of the company as of July 1, 1990, in terms
of the newly instituted currency. East German companies had organized their
bookkeeping toward reporting to the central planning agency, had never been
audited according to western standards, and had never worked under DM cost
structures. Bringing the books into a standardized form took thousands of billable
hours of accountants and lawyers and was a learning experience for all involved.
Nevertheless, it was a crucial first step toward getting the legal structure and
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accounts of Treuhand-owned companies to follow a comprehensible, useful for-
mat. As the auditors quickly reviewed thousands of companies, they frequently
found it necessary to set aside substantial amounts as reserves for potential liabili-
ties. Auditors being as cautious class, especially in unfamiliar surroundings, the
initial reserves were often much larger than they needed to be.
If the THA company's balance sheet discloses potential liabilities, two possible
arrangements are used. If the likelihood of occurrence appears rather remote, the
original sale price is not reduced, but the THA promises to pay up to the reserved
amount if the risk is later realized. If the risk seems quite likely to occur, the
original sales price is decreased accordingly, often by decreasing the net asset
value. If the feared event does not take place within a certain period of time (and
the reserved amount thus is not used), the buyer pays the THA a subsequent
increase in purchase price. In this case, the subsequent increase in purchase price
often is detached from the "disposition" of the reserve in terms of account
balancing. In order to guarantee an appropriate use of the reserved amount, the
THA normally retains the right to codetermination for a specified period. It may
also offer the purchaser an incentive to act in a way to minimize use of the reserve,
such as by sharing 25 percent of the reserved amount not used.
Reserve clauses are a handy tool for both the THA and its purchasers. Rather
than allowing negotiations to fail because of potential risks such clauses offer a
way to reach a fair settlement with minimum negotiating. Over time, as the various
risks first uncovered in the DM opening balance sheets have or have not come
to pass, the need for such reserve clauses has gradually declined to a level similar
to that expected in the usual course of business.
H. DIFFICULTIES WITH BASIC SELLER'S REPRESENTATIONS
The factors leading to the Treuhand's need to give only short and very simple
seller's representations and warranties have already been discussed. Frequently
the Treuhand's warranties are limited to three points: (1) the existence of the
company; (2) the holding of shares by the seller; and finally, (3) the company's
title to its real estate. Even these basic representations, which in all fairness a
buyer should be able to expect, can give rise to substantial legal problems and
may only be given by the Treuhand after painstaking review. When these basic
representations prove problematic, investors' worst fears may surface. This un-
certainty is aggravated in the case of those investors who come from afar, plan
to leave soon, and are not aware of how common and solvable (albeit aggravating)
the problems are. Since the Treuhand itself may not uncover its inability to give
a representation until it has been asked to do so, the timing of the discovery (for
instance, immediately before final contract negotiations are due to begin) may be
especially unsettling. Under these circumstances, the investor is advised to pro-
ceed to other points in the negotiations on the assumption that a reasonable solution
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will eventually surface. The Treuhand is not trying to sell something it does not
have. It is merely trying to operate in a context in which one legal and economic
system has been imperfectly grafted onto an entirely different one.
To take one example, there are a number of grounds why it might be difficult
for the Treuhand to give a clean opinion regarding title to real estate (other than
possible restitution claims, which are discussed in more detail below). Under the
Communist regime in the GDR, the vast majority of land and buildings were held
as "people's property." That ownership was reflected in the GDR land records.
In theory, people's property belonged to everybody. In making the transition back
to a system based on private, rather than people's, property, the question was
presented-to be resolved over and over-which land and buildings should be
reflected in the land records as belonging to which newly formed corporation?
The Treuhand Act's solution was to follow the ownership lines established under
the GDR legal principle of "holder of right" (Rechtstragerschaft). Individual
"People's Owned Companies" (Volkseigene Betriebe or VEB) were usually noted
in the land records as the holders of right to the property they used. The THA-
owned stock company that was the legal successor to a VEB, by the formal
working of the Treuhand Act, assumed those rights.
Problems quickly arose because the legal niceties required to establish the rights
of holders of right were often imperfectly followed. The initial solution in the
Treuhand Act soon uncovered myriad individual cases where strict application
led to senseless and contrary results. A later amendment to the Treuhand Act
2
yielded some clarity. What no amendment to the Act could accomplish was to
bring order into land records. Land record offices that had been neglected for
forty years were immediately called on to respond to an entirely new set of
circumstances. The resulting breakdown in the recording system is only gradually
being sorted out, as overwhelmed offices throughout former East Germany work
through their backlogs. Thus, in order for the Treuhand to be able to give a
standard representation as to title, it frequently proves necessary to do additional
research or to put land records offices under pressure to respond in a timely
manner. Comparable problems can arise in regard to representations about the
formation of the company or the Treuhand's ownership of shares.
I. ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE CLAUSES
1. Environmental Damage-Background Issues
Prospective purchasers looking at their first acquisition on the other side of the
Wall may be inclined to panic when the issue of environmental damage first comes
up. The panic is rarely necessary. Until 1945, East and West Germany were one,
and the same standards applied. During the golden years of the West German
2. 5 Durchfiihrungsverordnung zum Treuhandgesetz [5th Executory Ordinance to Treuhandge-
setz] of Sept. 12, 1990, GB1. I at 1466.
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Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle, in the 1950s and 1960s, environmental
protections were none too stringent. Only in the 1970s did the environmental
paths of East and West Germany first markedly diverge. While West Germany
increasingly developed and enforced environmental legislation, the former GDR
continued its old routine. Resources were, after all, scarce and environmental
protection was secondary to survival of the communist economic system.
Some of the sights and smells in East Germany may remind one strongly of
industrialized New Jersey or Dortmund in the early 1960s and extreme pockets
may even resemble Pittsburgh of the same era. But those anticipating a countryside
virtually destroyed by pollution are overly pessimistic. Environmental risk can
be assessed, likely cleanup costs measured, and a manageable allocation of risk
agreed upon. What a prospective purchaser has to bear in mind, however, is that
1990 West German environmental laws (with some important, and for investors
favorable, exceptions) were imposed on an industrial society operating under
1950s environmental sensitivities.
2. Safe Harbor Rules Under the General
Environmental Act (Umweltrahmengesetz)
Though environmental issues should not be overly mystified, clearly there are
concerns to address when buying an industrial facility that meets 1950s standards
when 1990s rules apply. In partial response the lawmakers, under the General
Environmental Act, granted a limited safe harbor exemption from current stan-
dards in the new federal states only. This exemption enabled the governments of
the various new states to release company purchasers from cleanup responsibilities
they would otherwise have had for environmental damage that occurred prior to
June 30, 1990. This safe harbor window closed on March 28, 1992, but before
it closed a great many Treuhand-owned companies filed timely applications for
the safe harbor.
The experiences of individual companies in applying for this safe harbor and
in having the application accepted have to date been mixed. The requirements for
and the legal consequences of such environmental releases are far from clear.
Likewise, it is unclear if full environmental studies need to be submitted with a
safe harbor application and, if so and if the application is later rejected, whether
the same study can be used to prosecute the applicant for environmental cleanup.
Currently close to 2,000 known applications for safe harbor releases are pending
on which no decision has been made. The impasse is only likely to be resolved
when the financially strapped new states and the federal government are able to
negotiate a settlement regarding payment of required cleanup costs on the proper-
ties for which the new owners have been granted environmental releases.
3. Contractual Distribution of Environmental Risks
Within certain guidelines set forth by the Federal Finance Ministry, the Treu-
hand is fundamentally prepared to share with its purchasers the costs of making
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a site meet minimal, legally required environmental standards. The Treuhand is
not, however, prepared to assume consequential damages or damages whose
amount depends on the future activity of the purchaser. As the owner of its
companies, the Treuhand does not have direct, unlimited liability to pay for their
cleanup costs. If the cost of the potential cleanup clearly exceeds the Treuhand's
economic interest in a company, the Treuhand has the option of placing the
company in bankruptcy and avoiding any obligation for cleanup costs greater than
its equity in the company. The existence of this option places an upper limit on
the Treuhand's willingness to negotiate terms.
The allocation of risk for cleanup costs may follow a wide variety of formats
and be tailored to reflect the particular risks of most concern. An often used option
is to establish a base cleanup amount for which the purchaser bears sole liability,
an intermediate cost amount to be shared in some ratio between the Treuhand and
the purchaser, and a remainder to be borne by the THA or the purchaser alone.
Those risks that have been verified by expert study prior to the closing may be
allocated according to one method, and as yet unknown risks according to a second
method. The parties might agree to allocate costs of specific cleanup problems
differently, so that, for instance, the Treuhand would share costs for cleanup of
old oil, but costs of asbestos removal might be the purchaser's sole responsibility.
The Treuhand only helps to pay for cost-effective cleanup and normally retains
the right to review and approve plans and budgets to avoid unjustifiably large
expenses. In addition, the Treuhand limits its help by paying only for those
costs required to make the particular, contemplated use comply with applicable
standards. Thus, if part of a site is to be paved over for traffic and not used for
a building, the THA refuses to pay for anything beyond the cleanup needed to
enable that site to meet the less stringent guidelines for paved areas.
In the event of serious questions about possible cleanup risks, professional
environmental studies normally play a central role in Treuhand contracts, as they
do when companies are bought and sold in other more normal contexts. The
studies help the parties assess and control the major feared possible risks by
scientific tests before any acquisition contract is concluded. Such tests prior to
contract conclusion are often stipulated by the THA, which is not prepared to take
on contractual cleanup obligations without having a sense of their potential scope.
4. "Green Field" Threat
In order to force the Treuhand to accept a greater portion of cleanup costs,
potential purchasers may threaten to bypass environmental problems with one site
by building a new facility on a "green field" site in the area-taking the key
employees and starting afresh. Because of its nature as a governmental super-
owner and super-seller, this threat does not scare the Treuhand as much as it might
a private seller of a single environmentally damaged property. The THA is not
so wedded to any particular location that it is prepared to pay to reconstruct all
properties at public expense until they are suitable for their intended purpose or
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suitable to continue an existing use. If a new "green field" investment is more
appropriate than spending millions to make an old industrial site usable, the
Treuhand might decide to offer one of its many other sites to a purchaser. The
Treuhand would then either sell the damaged site for a use that would not require
so much cleanup, or retain the site and clean it only to the extent of removing
urgent threats to public safety.
5. Treuhand Guarantee of Cleanup Costs
If a purchaser is buying assets from a Treuhand-owned company rather than
stock in the company from the Treuhand itself, THA approval of the contract may
be required, but the Treuhand itself does not become a party to the contract
and normally assumes no direct liability under its terms. Given that many THA
companies have poor credit standing and may even be on the brink of liquidation
or bankruptcy, purchasers of assets may ask the Treuhand to guarantee any
future environmental risk-sharing obligations undertaken by the Treuhand-owned
company. Increasingly, the Treuhand only grants such a guarantee in exchange
for direct payment to it of what amounts to an insurance premium for assuming
a legal liability it would not otherwise have had.
J. RESTITUTION CLAIMS
1. Background
As discussed above, the analysis and resolution of environmental damage issues
in Treuhand contracts do not differ drastically from those in other contexts. The
same cannot be said for dealing with restitution claims. Such claims arise from
the transitional legal peculiarities in the former GDR and they are unique to
this place and time. The Unification Contract between West and East Germany
established the principle that people who had lost their properties in various
waves of Nazi and post-1949 communist nationalizations had a right to its return
(Vermegensgesetz or Property Act). Only as a secondary alternative to this right
of return would they have a right to monetary compensation.
Restitution claims may be filed for the return of real property, businesses, and
other identifiable assets such as bonds and bank accounts. They are a central
concern in the selling of many THA-owned enterprises. In practice, this general
principle of "return before compensation" has proven one of the greatest sources
of uncertainty and confusion for investors.
All restitution claims must be filed in property offices (Vermogensdmter),
which were newly formed for the task of handling such claims. The filing of such
a claim triggers a ban on the disposition of the asset against which the claim has
been filed. The scope of the ban depends on the kind of asset. A restitution claim
for a "business" bans the sale not only of the shares reflecting ownership of the
business, but of all assets belonging to the company essential to the continuance
of its business. Although the issue is not yet statutorily regulated, it is current
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accepted practice that a restitution claim for real property belonging to a company
merely bans the sale of the specific parcel against which the claim has been made.
The shares in the company owning the claimed parcel may still be sold, though
the parcel itself will remain subject to the claim.
2. Methods to Lift Ban on Sale
Before the Treuhand can sell any shares or real property, it must determine
whether any restitution claims have been filed with the responsible property
office. If they have, the THA must analyze whether the claims have been made
against a "business" or against real property. On the basis of this analysis, the
THA can determine whether the planned transaction is possible immediately, or
whether it must use one of the following methods to set aside the ban on sales.
a. By Agreement
The simplest way to remove the threat of restitution claims is to enter a contract
with the claimants whereby they release their claim to restitution in exchange for
compensation out of the sales proceeds. The Treuhand and the bidder can approach
the claimants jointly and negotiate a settlement with them that will enable the
purchaser to proceed with the acquisition-and later investments in it-with a
minimum of concern about potential restitution.
b. By Proceeding Under the Investment Priority Act
of July 14, 1992 (Investitionsvorrangsgesetz)3
A partial statutory solution to the strict application of the "restitution before
compensation" rule for businesses and properties is included in the Investment
Priority Act. By using the proceeding under the Investment Priority Act, a special
section of the legal department of the THA can set aside the ban on sale by granting
potential purchasers an "Investment Preference Decision" (Investitionsvorrang-
bescheid). The Treuhand can issue such a decision only when the investing com-
pany commits itself to undertake specific, written investment measures and agrees
to return the assets against which the claim has been filed if it does not make the
agreed investment. Restitution claimants have a right to participate in Investment
Priority Act proceedings and propose their own, alternative investment plans.
The Treuhand grants an Investment Preference Decision only when the investor's
proposed investment and the investor's ability to carry it out substantially exceed
those of the restitution claimants. In practice, that restitution claimants (often
groups of heirs, the individual members of which have widely different goals and
abilities to carry them out), frequently are unable to come up with credible or
competitive investment plans within the time period required. The Treuhand can
then grant the Investment Preference Decision without further delay.
3. Gesetz Ober den Vorrang fOr Investitionen bei Riucktibertragungsanspriichen nach dem Ver-
m6gensgesetz (Investitionsvorrangsgesetz) of July 14, 1992, BGB1. I at 1268.
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c. Appeal Rights
Restitution claimants have a legal right to protest the granting of an Investment
Preference Decision in court, theoretically giving them the chance to block a
privatization with years of litigation. Practically, this litigation course has seldom
been taken. When it has, the cases primarily have involved first-class, downtown
Berlin real estate. Litigation involving factories has been even less common, and
those few cases have been pursued by claimants with less diligence.
d. Unjustified Restitution Claimants
Another way to set aside the ban on sales is to seek a decision from the responsi-
ble property office that the restitution claim in question is unjustified. For exam-
ple, claimants who lost their property between 1945 and 1949 have no rights to
restitution; and claimants for less than 50 percent of the shares of a seized company
have no such right. Claimants seeking the return of a business are also blocked
when the current company bears little resemblance to the company that was seized,
or when the company has been shut and is unlikely to be brought back into
operation. On a case-by-case basis, the property office can thus decide to lift the
ban on sales and void the restitution claim. In extreme cases, where the restitution
claim is clearly groundless, the Treuhand has the discretion to sell property subject
to the claim without waiting for the decision of the property office.
3. Closing the Deal-Despite Claims
The Treuhand has two basic ways to transfer a company subject to restitution
claims. The first choice is to resolve the restitution claims prior to transfer of the
company (following the procedures described above to their end) and to draft an
outright sales contract reflecting the requirements of the procedure followed.
Unfortunately, this clearly preferable solution is not always practicable when the
Treuhand is under pressure to sell companies and buyers are anxious to take them
over.
Frequently, the second option must be followed and contracts closed despite
uncertainty presented by still-unresolved restitution claims. In this event, the
Treuhand may agree to a sale that is complete except for the later satisfaction of
the condition precedent that the restitution claims have to be settled within a
specified time period according to one of the several methods outlined above.
Once the restitution claims are settled, the formal transfer then takes place auto-
matically. During the interim period, the Treuhand delivers operating control of
the company to the purchaser, but may retain at least partial responsibility for
interim losses. Since one cannot be expected to invest heavily in a property one
does not own, the deadline for any contractual investment commitments will be
extended until the interim period is over.
As previously discussed, in share deals where a restitution claim has been raised
against property belonging to the company, the sale of the business can proceed
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without ban, but subject to the claim. Many such transactions have been closed
with the following being agreed between the purchaser and the THA:
The Treuhand undertakes to use its best efforts to attempt to have the restitution
claim reduced to a claim for compensation; if a restitution claim succeeds after
the share transfer has been completed, the Treuhand agrees to pay the share
purchaser the then-current book value of the property reclaimed; the paid-in
capital of the THA-sold company thus remains unchanged by the property return.
If the return of the property dooms the enterprise as a whole, this risk cannot be
entirely eliminated or compensated by such a solution. The Treuhand then nor-
mally agrees to permit the purchaser to void the contract in exchange for return
of the original purchase price. The Treuhand does not offer further compensation
or consequential damages. In some circumstances, however, the investor may be
able to get compensation from the successful restitution claimant.
K. FINANCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE THA AND
ITS COMPANIES IN SHARE DEALS
1. Compensation Claims Under Deutsch Mark
Opening Balance Law (DM Bilanzgesetz or DMBiJ G)
4
In addition to the relation between a stockholder and its enterprise, the Treuhand
has numerous further legal and financial ties to its portfolio companies. The
Treuhand's goal in selling a firm is to release itself of all these ties. A few of the
Treuhand's legal obligations as owner are remnants of the communist social order,
in which individual companies played a highly paternalistic role towards their
workers. Others arose during the transitional period of Treuhand management,
and others reflect the Treuhand's continued need to heavily subsidize its portfolio
companies.
Section 24 of the DMBiIG provided Treuhand-owned companies with a "com-
pensating balance claim" (Ausgleichsanspruch) to protect them against the conse-
quences of possible overindebtedness as of July 1, 1991. These claims were made
against the THA, and the THA then had the opportunity, for a certain period after
a company's DM opening balance sheet was approved, to decide whether or not
to recognize them. THA paid the claims that it recognized, thereby saving the
company from a forced bankruptcy filing. Claims of companies deemed not
salvageable were denied, thus forcing the company to file for bankruptcy. In the
context of the sale of shares in a company, it is prudent to clarify whether or not
the company has had a compensating balance claim and how it was resolved.
2. Old Debts
As discussed above, the communist economic system imposed substantial debts
on the balance sheets of individual companies. The creditor for these debts was
4. Gesetz Ober die Er6ffnungsbilanz in deutscher Mark und die Kapitalneufestsetzung (DM-
Bilanzgesetz) of Apr. 18, 1991, BGB1. I at 971, as amended on Dec. 20, 1991, BGB1. I at 2290.
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normally either the State Bank of the GDR or a state foreign trade company. In
the context of the unification process, many of these old debts were refinanced
and transformed into real, though indirect debts of individual Treuhand-owned
companies to western, primarily former West German, commercial banks. In the
context of privatization, the treatment of old debt needs to be resolved. Insofar
as old debts are released or assumed by the THA at sale, this naturally is reflected
in stockholders' equity and in the sale price.
3. Guarantees of Liquidity Credits
In order to ensure the liquidity of its portfolio companies during the first shock
of their transition to the market economy, the Treuhand was forced to guarantee
billions in DM worth of liquidity credits that private banks extended to its compa-
nies. When selling companies, the THA seeks either to have the liquidity credit
guarantee assumed by the purchaser or to have the underlying debt repaid. The
resolution must be negotiated in each case.
4. Unknown Assets
The Treuhand frequently is not aware of all of the assets owned by its portfolio
companies. The company may, for example, have undisclosed shares in other
companies, real estate, or valuable trademarks, the value of which is not reflected
in the purchase price. In order to avoid a windfall gain to the purchaser, the
Treuhand frequently thus negotiates protective clauses requiring the purchaser to
return to or purchase from the THA later-discovered property not accurately
reflected in the company's financial statements at the time of sale. Insofar as this
solution presents problems under laws regarding the legally required nominal
capital of public stock companies, it is often advisable to style such possible future
payments or transfers as subsequent purchase price adjustments.
I1. Conclusion
The Treuhandanstalt has, during the course of its brief existence, become a
reasonably well-functioning mergers and acquisitions factory. It mass produces
company sales with a view to maximizing future growth. The conditions of the
sale are without historical precedent; but with communism in ruins, they are not
unique. Other countries now faced with the challenge of rebuilding might consider
some of the decisions which Germany made, which then made it possible for a
sale on this scale, with this careful attention to the future, to occur.
The German commitment to the privatization process has never been in doubt.
The specific legal framework of unification was hastily constructed and is being
gradually refined, but the German Government has never wavered about whether
the sales should happen. The Treuhand has instituted a legal and accounting
framework and has developed fairly well-standardized and generally agreed pro-
cedures. Overall, the Treuhand has established a way of doing business and now
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has many experts trained in it and in helping investors through it. After the few
initial pioneering months, standard methods of control were introduced to guard
against conflicts of interest and to ensure that the Treuhand guidelines were being
followed. Assets were sold for low prices in exchange for reasonable future
commitments, and the response, both from German and non-German investors,
has been remarkable.
No organization that assumed the Treuhand's tasks could be popular. Wisely,
the Treuhand was given the political independence to reach its goals. In order to
make its companies marketable, the Treuhand had to lay off hundreds of thousands
of workers, including hundreds of company leaders who had colluded with the
secret police. It has had to put over 1,800 companies in liquidation. By creating
a powerful, centralized holding, capable of making decisions tough enough to
reflect the reality, mass company sales were made possible. The Treuhand does
the dirty work, so that every investor can be a white knight. Countries that do
not exert such controls may find themselves bled dry by the demands of inefficient
state enterprises. Trying to leave those messy tasks to investors will save short-
term political problems, but probably hinder long-term economic growth. Each
country will have to make its own calculations and compromises. A German-style
Treuhand is certainly effective, but undiluted, its medicine may be too bitter for
new governments to swallow. The open question is how much of its lessons and
expertise can be translated into other contexts.
A little over two years after beginning its task, ownership of most of the
industrial plant of an entire country has changed hands. Critics charge that the
Treuhand is succeeding only in an unprecedented giveaway of national treasures
to neo-colonialists. The criticism is harsh and ignores the 1,700 companies sold
to former GDR citizens. The criticism also takes no account of the tremendous
expense of maintaining national treasures that under chanted conditions have
become national dinosaurs. Time will tell whether the course chosen was the best
one. It seems clear, however, that the former GDR, after an especially rough
start, has a more solid foundation for growth than that found in many of its
former socialist friendship states. The Treuhand has done what it can to build that
foundation.
In a very short period, the Treuhand helped create conditions under which
thousands of investors took the plunge of major, long-term commitments into
once-hostile waters. Compared to the former GDR, other formerly communist
nations have low costs, soft currencies, and mostly captive domestic markets. If
these countries of the former East Bloc do not quickly set up their own structures
to encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking, the capital needed to rebuild their econo-
mies will not be mobilized and their situation can only worsen. Other nations will
clearly not be able to afford all the Treuhand's luxuries, but they would be well
advised to take what they can use and afford from its experience. There is much
worth studying and some worth adopting.
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